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Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory:
Districtof Columbia v. Heller and
Judicial Ipse Dixit
CARLTON F.W. LARSON*

INTRODUCTION

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm.'
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court suggested that the right was
primarily about individual self-defense, particularly in "the home, where
the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute."2 Indeed,
the Court went so far as to claim, "[W]hatever else [the Second
Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms
in defense of hearth and home."3
Yet the Court notoriously did not offer any standard of scrutiny for
firearms regulations, simply concluding that the District of Columbia's
handgun ban violated "any of the standards of scrutiny that we have
applied to enumerated constitutional rights."4 However, the Court also
went out of its way to announce the following:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today
of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications
on the commercial sale of arms.5
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law. My thanks to Professor
Calvin Massey and the Hastings Law Journal for organizing this Symposium. Thanks also to Erin
Murphy of the UC Davis Law School Library, and to Rachel Anderson and Craig Baumgartner for
valuable research assistance. This project received financial support from the Dean's Office at UC
Davis School of Law.
I. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22 (2008).
2. Id. at 2817.
3. Id. at 2821.
4. Id. at 2817.
5. Id. at 2816-17.
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The Court offered no citations to support this statement, and its ad hoc,
patchy quality has been readily apparent to commentators, who have
speculated that it was compromise language designed to secure Justice
Kennedy's vote.6 More cuttingly, Justice Breyer suggested that these
exceptions amounted to little more than "judicial ipse dixit."7
I call the exceptions in this statement the four Heller exceptions.
Although these exceptions are arguably dicta, they are dicta of the
strongest sort. The Court described these exceptions as "presumptively
lawful regulatory measures," and it is hard to imagine the Court
invalidating them in a future case.' For all practical purposes, these issues
have been decided-and decided in favor of constitutionality.
In this Essay, I explore the implications of these exceptions for the
future of gun regulation in America. Specifically, I wish to treat these
exceptions as serious statements of the law, and ask whether they fit into
a coherent theory of the Second Amendment. What theory, if any, can
explain the Court invalidating the District of Columbia handgun ban,
while simultaneously upholding the laws referenced in the exceptions?
My purpose is not to rehash the correctness of Heller, but to ask where
we go from here, assuming Heller is valid law.
In broad terms, there are two general approaches to the exceptions.
First, they could be examples of originalist reasoning at a fairly specific
level of application, what Jack Balkin would refer to as "original
expected application[s]." 9 Under this view, the exceptions are justified
because nobody in 1791 would have expected the Second Amendment to
invalidate regulations of this sort. Indeed, in response to Justice Breyer's
dissent, the Court noted, "[T]here will be time enough to expound upon
the historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and
when those exceptions come before us.""° The Court thus implied that
specific historical justifications are necessary to uphold the exceptions.
Yet, as I argue in Part I, such a view is almost impossible to maintain.
The Heller exceptions lack the historical grounding that would normally
justify an exception to a significant constitutional right. Whatever the
Court is doing here, it is not rigorously grounded in eighteenth-century
sources.

6. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419,
420 (2009). For other denunciations of the arbitrary nature of these exceptions, see J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions,and the Unraveling of Law, 95 VA.L. REV. 253, 279 (2oo9); and A
Puzzle About Heller, http://Ieiterlegalphilosophy.typepad.comleiter/2oo8/o6/a-puzzle-about.html (June
27, 2008).
7. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2870 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8. See id. at 2817 n.26 (majority opinion).
9. See Jack Balkin, Abortion and OriginalMeaning,24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 296-97 (2oo7).
so. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2821.
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Second, the exceptions might be explained not on originalist
grounds, but as results of an unstated standard of scrutiny. Under this
view, the exceptions can be "reverse engineered" to identify the standard
of scrutiny actually employed. As I argue in Part II, the standard of
scrutiny simply cannot be strict scrutiny, as many of the exceptions are
inexplicable under strict scrutiny, a point hinted at by Justice Breyer in
dissent. 1 The Court is applying some lower standard of scrutiny, but it is
difficult to know what precisely it is.
I. ORIGINALIST ANALYSIS OF THE HELLER EXCEPTIONS

Originalist theory has grown in sophistication over the last twenty
years. Originalists now emphasize the original public meaning of the
constitutional text rather than looking to the specific intent of the
Framers or ratifiers. 2 Originalists have also emphasized a distinction
between constitutional interpretation, which uses originalist methods to
determine the linguistic meaning of constitutional text, and constitutional
construction, which employs other methods to generate operative
meaning in situations in which the text is unclear. 3 As Professor
Lawrence Solum, a leading proponent of this distinction, has
emphasized, the Heller Court may well have used originalist methods of
interpretation to determine the core meaning of the Second
Amendment, while leaving the issues addressed by the exceptions to the
more challenging task of constitutional construction. 4 Under this view,
there is little conflict between the bulk of the Court's opinion and the
exceptions, because they can be justified under different, although
complementary, methodologies.
This is an intriguing and fascinating argument. I am not persuaded,
however, that this explains exactly what the Court had in mind in Heller.
The Court's claim about the need to "expound upon the historical
justifications for the exceptions" in a later case seems inconsistent with a
stark interpretation/construction dichotomy." Moreover, Justice Scalia,
the author of the opinion, has not generally embraced such a distinction;
his methods are much closer to identifying "original expected
application[s]," working at a very specific level of detail. 6 Accordingly,
this Part analyzes the exceptions as a Scalian originalist would, by

i i. See id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority approves exceptions "whose
constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard would be far from clear").
12. See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REv.
932, 933-34 (2o-9).
13. See id. at 934.

14. Id. at 969-71.
15. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
16. See Balkin, supra note 9.
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seeking to identify historical 17 predicates and justifications for the
exceptions announced in Heller.
A.

THEFELON EXCEPTION

Even early supporters of a strong individual-rights view of the
Second Amendment have readily endorsed prohibitions on ownership of
firearms by convicted felons. For example, in an important 1983
Michigan Law Review article, Don Kates, a leader of the individualrights movement, argued that felon disarmament laws were clearly
constitutional because the "Founders [did not] consider[] felons within
the common law right to arms."'' 8 Yet the actual sources Kates relied
upon (and which subsequent writers have echoed'9 ) are surprisingly thin.
Indeed, so far as I can determine, no colonial or state law in eighteenthcentury America formally restricted the ability of felons to own firearms.
So what sources support this conclusion? The same three sources recur
again and again in the literature, yet none are especially probative.
The first source offered to support the felon exclusion is a failed
amendment offered by Samuel Adams in the Massachusetts ratifying
convention."0 Adams's amendment would have invalidated any laws that
"prevent the people of the United States, who are peaceable citizens,
from keeping their own arms."'" There are at least three reasons to
question this source as supporting the felon exception. First, as a failed
amendment offered by an Anti-Federalist, it has no direct link with the
Second Amendment that was actually adopted. Second, the critical
words "peaceable citizens" do not appear in the text of the Second
Amendment itself, which refers broadly to "the people." Third,
"peaceable citizens" might mean "nonfelons," but that reading is neither
obvious nor required.2 Nonviolent criminals such as forgers, for
example, might well be considered "peaceable."

17. For a critical evaluation of the Court's use of history in Heller, see Saul Cornell, Originalism
on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (2oo8).
I8. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibitionand the OriginalMeaning of the Second Amendment,
82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 266 (1983).

i9. See, e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of the State: Bearing
Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 131, 147, 185 (i991); see also
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2005) (relying on similar sources for the claim

that "felons, infants, and those of unsound mind may be prohibited from possessing firearms").
20. See, e.g., Halbrook, supra note 19, at 147 (citing DEBATES OF THE MASSACHUSETrS CONVENTION
OF 1788, at 86-87, 266 (Boston, 1856)) (Samuel Adams' proposed amendments); Kates, supra note 18,
at 222, 267 (same).
21. THE

DEBATES

AND

PROCEEDINGS

IN

THE

CONVENTION

OF

THE

COMMONWEALTH

OF

MASSACHUSETTS, HELD IN THE YEAR 1788, at 86 (1856).
22. Cf THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1789)
(defining "peaceable" as "[flree from war, free from tumult; quiet, undisturbed; not quarrelsome, not
turbulent").
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The second source offered to support the felon exclusion is the state
of New Hampshire's recommended amendment that "Congress shall
never disarm any citizen, unless such as are or have been in actual
rebellion." 3 This proposal, unlike the Samuel Adams proposal, was
adopted by a majority of the state convention, yet its terms are
significantly narrower than a broad disarmament of felons. Rebellion is
only one type of felony, and the explicit limitation to rebellion strongly
suggests that extension to any other felony would be inappropriate.
The third source offered to support the felon exclusion, and certainly
the strongest, is a minority report by Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists.24
These dissenters offered a proposed amendment stating, in part, "no law
shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them unless for crimes
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals." 5 This is
much closer to felon disarmament than is the Samuel Adams proposal or
the New Hampshire proposal, and it suggests a broad power of
disarmament for categories of persons deemed dangerous. Yet like the
Samuel Adams proposal, it was offered by opponents of the
Constitution, and its text is not reflected in the Second Amendment as
proposed and ratified.
None of these statements alone or collectively support the notion
that felon disarmament laws were viewed as consistent with the Second
Amendment at the time it was adopted. The best one can say is that at
least some people in Pennsylvania felt criminals could be disarmed. And
perhaps that is enough, in the absence of any explicit contemporary
statements to the contrary. But such evidence would surely be
inconclusive at best in other constitutional contexts. No court, for
example, would rely on one statement from Pennsylvania AntiFederalists to uphold a law that prohibited felons from exercising
religious freedom.
The absence of an explicit felon exception in the text of the Second
Amendment is echoed in state constitutional provisions. 6 Only one state
constitutional provision addressing the right to bear arms contains an
exception for felons. 7 This provision, Idaho's, was enacted in 1978.28

23. I JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787,

at 326 (2d ed. 189i); Kates, supra note 18, at 222.
24. See, e.g., Halbrook, supra note 19, at 142; Kates, supra note 18, at 222.

25. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (787), in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 662, 665 (1971).

26. For a useful overview of state constitutional provisions, see generally Eugene Volokh, State
ConstitutionalRight to Keep and Bear Arms, I I TEX. REV. L. &POL. 191 (2oo6).
27. See IDAHO CONST. art. I, § II.

28. Id.
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So where do felon disarmament laws come from? As far as I can
determine, state laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms or
denying firearms licenses to felons date from the early part of the
twentieth century. The earliest such law was enacted in New York in
1897, and similar laws were passed by Illinois in i919, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, and California in 1923, and Nevada in 1925.29 California's
law, which prohibited felons from owning or possessing any "pistol,
revolver or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person,"3
was quickly challenged. A California appellate court upheld this law,
noting that "the right to keep and bear arms is not a right guaranteed
either by the federal Constitution or by the state Constitution."'" The
court noted that the law limited a felon's natural right to self-defense
against "personal violence," but concluded that such natural rights were
subject to reasonable regulation by the legislature.32
In 193o, a Uniform Fire Arms Act was adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.33 The Uniform
Act stated that "[n]o person who has been convicted in this state or
elsewhere of a crime of violence, shall own a pistol or have one in his
possession or under his control."34 This formulation-limited to crimes of
violence-was somewhat narrower than that of felonies more generally,35
and it was adopted by Pennsylvania in 1931.36
In sum, felon disarmament laws significantly postdate both the
Second Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. An originalist
argument that sought to identify 1791 or I868 analogues to felon
disarmament laws would be quite difficult to make.
B.

THE EXCEPTION FOR THE MENTALLY ILL

The story is similar with respect to the exception for the mentally ill.
One searches in vain through eighteenth-century records to find any laws
specifically excluding the mentally ill from firearms ownership. Such laws
seem to have originated in the twentieth century. The Uniform Fire

29. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND

PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING

862-63

(1925).

For the New Hampshire act, see

Act of May 4, 1923, § 3, 1923 N.H. Laws 138.
o
3 . Act of June 13, 1923, ch. 339, § 2, 1923 Cal. Stat. 696, 696.
31. People v. Camperlingo, 231 P. 6oi, 6o3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924).
32. Id. at 604.
33. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 563 (1930) [hereinafter 193o HANDBOOK].
34. Id.
35. See id. (defining "crime of violence" as "murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, assault to do
great bodily harm, robbery, burglary [housebreaking, breaking and entering, and larceny]").
36. Act of June ii, 1931, §4, 1931 Pa. Laws 497, 498.
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Arms Act of 1930 prohibited delivery of a pistol to any person of
"unsound mind,"37 a provision echoed in subsequent state legislation.
Nonetheless, it is possible to make alternative originalist arguments.
First, in eighteenth-century America, justices of the peace were
authorized to "lock up" "lunatics" who were "dangerous to be permitted
to go abroad."39 If this significant infringement of liberty was permissible,
then the lesser step of mere disarmament would likely be permissible as
well.
Second, one might make the originalist argument at a higher level of
generality-that any person viewed as potentially dangerous could be
disarmed by the government without running afoul of the "right to bear
arms." (This proposition would support felon disarmament laws as well.)
The Revolution itself provided examples of such laws in action. Shortly
before the outbreak of hostilities, a Massachusetts crowd of 2500 people
assembled to disarm Tories. 0 The Continental Congress recommended
that provincial assemblies "disarm all such as will not associate to defend
the American rights by arms."'" In 1777, Pennsylvania passed a law
requiring city and county officials to disarm all individuals who had not
taken the oath of allegiance to the state.42 In August 1777, the
Continental Congress recommended that the states of Pennsylvania and
Delaware disarm all persons "notoriously disaffected" to the American
cause.43 It also recommended that Pennsylvania executive authorities
undertake a "diligent search" in Philadelphia for the "firearms, swords
and bayonets" of those persons who had "not manifested their
attachment to the American cause." 44 The owners were to be
compensated for their weapons, which were to be delivered to the state
militia.45
On balance, however, it seems unlikely that the Court would accept
the argument at this level of generality. First, the Court may be wary of
making too much of these revolutionary-era laws, as they may represent
the type of excessive intrusions the Second Amendment was intended to

37. 193o HANDBOOK, supra note 33, at 565.
38. See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1968, ch. 737, § 7, 1968 Mass. Acts 623, 626 (codified as amended at
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 129B (2008)); Act of July 20, 1965, ch. 1030, § 400, 1965 N.Y. Laws 2343,
2472 (codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00.1 (McKinney 2008)).
39. HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE 329 (6th ed. 1774).
40. DIRK HOERDER, CROWD ACTION IN REVOLUTIONARY MASSACHUSETTS 1765-i78o, at 303 (1977).
41. I LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 397 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 1921).
42. Act of June 13, 1777, Ch. 756, § 3. 9 Pa. Laws 11o, 112-13. Similar disarmaments of Tories
occurred in New Jersey, South Carolina, and Connecticut. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT To BEAR
ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE 86, 9o, 98-99 (1989).
43. 8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 678-79 (Worthington C. Ford ed.,
1907).

44. Id. at 679.

45- Id.
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prevent. Second, at this level of generality, the justification would
arguably erode the core of the Second Amendment right identified in
Heller, at least in the absence of an internal domestic war. Finally, the
justification suggests significant deference to a legislature's assessment of
particular dangers -a deference the Court was unwilling to extend to the
District of Columbia with respect to the handgun ban.
The strongest originalist argument for the exception for the mentally
ill rests on the traditional ability of justices of the peace to confine
individuals with dangerous mental impairments. Specific eighteenthcentury laws disarming the mentally ill, however, simply do not exist.
C.

THE EXCEPTION FOR SENSITIVE PLACES

The exception for sensitive places is probably the easiest of the
exceptions to justify on strict originalist grounds. An English statute from
1328 prohibited subjects from appearing armed "in fairs, markets, [and]
in the presence of the justices or other ministers. '' , 6 In the mid-i55os, a
man was found "armed in Westminster Hall... when the king's justices
were sitting in their places doing justice."47 He was immediately
imprisoned "for his aforesaid contempt and act, there to remain until his
fine was assessed upon him.""4 Asked "why he did this in the open hall,
being the place of justice and of peace, he answered that he did so for his
own safety."49 This argument, apparently, was insufficient to overcome
the rule against appearing armed in court. These precedents might
themselves justify the exception. On the other hand, this law predates the
firearms right recognized in the English Bill of Rights, may not have
been widely enforced, and may have been unfamiliar to the American
Founders. Moreover, the vague reference to "sensitive places' 5' is not
itself explicitly grounded in eighteenth-century sources, and the Court
may intend to require more specific justifications for each particular
sensitive place.
Evidence from the Reconstruction period may also support such
limitations under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to state laws.
For example, in i886, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld an 1875
state law that made it a crime for a person to "go into any school-room
or place where people are assembled for educational, literary, or social
46. Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. III, c. 3 (1328), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)
47. THE REPORTS OF WILLIAM DALISON 1552-1558, at III (John Baker ed., 2007).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
RIGHT 1o4-o6 (I994). The English statute was not completely unknown, however, as Blackstone
approvingly cited the statute's separate prohibition of "riding or going armed, with dangerous or
unusual weapons." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *I48-49.
51. See discussion infra Part II.C.
209
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purposes, or to any election precinct on election day, having upon or
about his person any kind of firearms."5 The court concluded, "The
statute is designed to promote personal security, and to check and put
down lawlessness, and is thus in perfect harmony with the constitution."53
D.

THE EXCEPTION FOR COMMERCIAL REGULATION

I have been unable to identify any eighteenth-century American
laws that specifically regulate commercial aspects of firearms sales.
Although some state commercial regulation probably began in the
nineteenth century, federal commercial regulation of firearms began in
1927, when Congress prohibited shipments of handguns to individuals
through the mail." Federal regulation of firearms dealers was also a
significant component of the National Firearms Act of 1934,55 the Federal
Firearms Act of 1938,56 and the Gun Control Act of I968."7 The
commercial restrictions with which we are most familiar are thus almost
entirely twentieth-century innovations.
The absence of commercial regulation in the eighteenth century
does not necessarily mean, of course, that the original public meaning of
the Second Amendment precluded such regulation. But it does mean
that an originalist argument that proceeded by identifying specific
eighteenth-century analogues to modern commercial regulations would
be extremely difficult to make.
II.

STANDARD OF SCRUTINY ANALYSIS OF THE HELLER EXCEPTIONS

If originalism fails to provide a sufficient grounding for all of the
Heller exceptions, perhaps they can be justified under some form of
balancing test, that is, by one of the typical tests that the Court uses when
evaluating other constitutional rights. This Part explores whether any
one test can explain each of the exceptions. I conclude that the answer is
yes, but only under a low standard of scrutiny. Specifically, I argue that it
is doctrinally impossible to conclude that strict scrutiny governs Second
Amendment claims, while also upholding the four Heller exceptions.
I also briefly consider other possible tests that might apply. The
Court has explicitly ruled out rational basis as the relevant test.5 What
are the other options? One possibility is an undue-burden test, such as
State v. Shelby, 2 S.W. 468,469 (Mo. I886).
53. Id.
54. Act of Feb. 8, 1927, ch. 76,44 Stat. 1o59, IO59-6o (1927).
55. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872.
56. 18 U.S.C. §§921-931.
57. Federal Gun Control Act, Pub. L. No. 9o-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
58. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2818 n.27 (2oo8) ("If all that was required to
overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be
redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.").
52.
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that used to evaluate abortion restrictions under Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.59 There is a hint of this in Heller itself, which notes that colonial
regulations did not "remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as
an absolute ban on handguns." ' ° Professor Lawrence Rosenthal has
argued for this test, concluding that the exceptions would pass the test,
but that the District of Columbia handgun ban would not. 6 ' The irony of
an undue-burden test somehow emerging implicitly from the pen of
Justice Scalia, however, would be rich indeed,6 ' and I doubt that a Court
majority would embrace this as the relevant test.
Other possibilities include some type of intermediate scrutiny or a
reasonableness test. As Professor Adam Winkler has demonstrated, state
courts interpreting firearms provisions in state constitutions have
uniformly applied a reasonableness standard. 63 This test appears slightly
more demanding than a64 rational-basis test, but still operates as a
relatively deferential test.
Other alternatives might take the form of hybrid approaches. For
example, Professor Calvin Massey has argued that material
infringements of Second Amendment rights must be substantially related
to a compelling state purpose, but that lesser infringements need not be.65
Relatedly, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Emerson held,
Although, as we have held, the Second Amendment does protect
individual rights, that does not mean that those rights may never be
made subject to any limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions or
restrictions for particular cases that are reasonable and not inconsistent
with the right of Americans generally to individually keep and bear
their private arms as historically understood in this country.
A. THE FELON EXCEPTION
The felon exception fares very poorly under traditional strict
scrutiny, which requires that government action be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest. 67 The problem is not the state interest
prong, which is straightforward. Surely saving lives and preventing gun
violence is a compelling state interest. But it is surprisingly difficult to
59. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,874 (1992).
6o. 128 S.Ct. at 2820.
6I. Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heler: Of Standards of Scrutiny,
Incorporation,Well-Regulated Militias,and CriminalStreet Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1,82-84 (2oo9).
62. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 987 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The ultimately standardless nature of
the 'undue-burden' inquiry is a reflection of the underlying fact that the concept has no principled or
coherent legal basis.").
63. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV.683,686-87 (2007).
64. Id. at 716-17.
65. Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1137
(2000).
66. 270 F.3 d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001).
67. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851 (2008).
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establish that the felon exclusion is narrowly tailored to serve this
interest. That is, the fit between being a convicted felon and being
someone who is likely to engage in unlawful acts with a gun, although far
from irrational, is not especially tight.
Consider first the case of nonviolent felons. Why would we think
that a tax evader, 68 an embezzler, 69 or someone who bribed a public
official" would be more likely to commit acts of gun violence? As
Professor Adam Winkler points out, "[iut is hard to imagine how banning
Martha Stewart or Enron's Andrew Fastow from possessing a gun
furthers public safety."7 The same could be said about drunk drivers" or
the producers of obscenity.73 And even with respect to violent criminals,
the exception is sweepingly broad. Is it at all realistic to think, say, that a
ninety-two year old man, confined to a wheelchair, who committed an
armed burglary in his early twenties and was released from prison over
sixty years ago, poses a realistic threat of unlawful gun violence? Felon
exceptions are thus significantly over-inclusive because they disarm large
numbers of people who pose no threat to anyone at all.
Second, there is the problem of gun misconduct that does not rise to
the level of a felony, such as recklessly firing a gun into the air,74 or
leaving a loaded firearm in a location easily accessible to a child.75 These
offenders have demonstrated a prior misuse of firearms, but are not
prohibited from future possession. In these cases, the felon exception is
somewhat under-inclusive, if the state interest is preventing future
unlawful conduct with a gun.
To see just how poorly felon disarmament laws fare under strict
scrutiny, it is helpful to consider analogies with other constitutional
provisions. Surely we would not strip felons of First Amendment rights
to free speech or free exercise of religion, solely because some of those
felons created child pornography or murdered someone as part of a
Satanic ritual. Felons, and arguably felons most especially, have full
protection under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments with

68. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006).
69. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 656,3581.
.
70 See, e.g., id. §§ 201, 3581.
71. Winkler, supra note 63, at 721.

72. See, e.g.,

CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23153,

23566 (West

2000

& Supp.

2009); CAL. PENAL CODE §

17

(West 1999).

73. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1465,3581.
74. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.15 (2008) (defining as a misdemeanor the offense of "knowingly
discharg[ing] a firearm in any public place or on the right-of-way of any paved public road, highway, or
street").
75. Courts have upheld tort liability for leaving guns in places easily accessible to children. See,
e.g., Kuhns v. Brugger, 135 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1957). On Heller's implications for such tort lawsuits, see
Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalizationof Self-Defense in Tort and Criminal Law, GrammaticallyCorrect Originalism,and Other Second Amendment Musings, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 1205 (2009).
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respect to fair trial issues and constitutionally-permissible punishments.
And it is hard to imagine that felons could be excluded from exercising
other constitutional rights, such as procreation, contraception, or
abortion. Indeed, the seminal case on procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma,
76
rejected a state attempt to single out habitual felons for sterilization.
Of course,
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
permits
the
disenfranchisement of felons,7 so one could argue that elimination of
Second Amendment rights is closer to the case of disenfranchisement
than to the elimination of rights under other amendments. This case
would be easy to make if the Supreme Court had grounded its decision
on the communal aspect of gun ownership as part of the militia. Just as a
community can exclude felons from voting, it can exclude felons from the
people who constitute the state's militia. But according to the Supreme
Court, the militia is not the primary focus of the amendment-it is about
personal self-defense.78
And that asserted focus makes it particularly difficult to justify the
felon exception under strict scrutiny. It is very hard to see how the felon's
interest in personal defense, in protecting his or her home and family
(many of whom may be completely innocent of any crime), is diminished
by his or her status as a convicted felon. Indeed, it does not seem
unreasonable to believe that many convicted felons may be the most in
need of a gun for purposes of self-defense. Their friends and associates
may well be other criminals of a decidedly nasty bent, they may have
histories of significant interpersonal violence, and they may live in
dangerous and crime-ridden neighborhoods.
It is therefore implausible to claim that an across-the-board
exclusion for all felons from this one particular constitutional right can
be justified as narrowly tailored under strict scrutiny. The Court must
have assumed, nonetheless, that the risk of inappropriate gun usage by
felons outweighs any self-defense benefit to the felon. I entirely agree
with this policy judgment, but it is important to note that it is a policy
judgment nonetheless, not explicitly grounded in the Second
Amendment's text or history, at least as that text and history is viewed by
the Heller majority.
The felon exception would, however, pass a reasonableness test. It
would probably also pass intermediate scrutiny, since it is arguably
substantially related to an important state interest. It may also pass an
undue-burden test, although this may be somewhat more doubtful, given
that the law does exclude felons entirely from gun ownership.

76. 316 U.S. 535, 535 (1942).

77. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 2.
78. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791-94 (2o08).
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B.

THE EXCEPTION FOR THE MENTALLY ILL

The purpose of this exception is presumably to keep the mentally ill
from harming themselves and others through use of a firearm. And
surely this is a compelling state interest. The question, as with felons, is
whether it is narrowly tailored. If so, then the exception passes strict
scrutiny and any other test as well.
"Mental illness" is an extremely broad category, covering a range of
conditions, some of which may be significantly more dangerous than
others. For example, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, a widely used handbook for mental-health professionals, lists
the following, among others, as forms of mental disorders: learning
disabilities, stuttering, autism, attention deficit disorder, eating disorders,
alcohol abuse, nicotine dependence, and insomnia.79 It is hard to see why
persons with these conditions should be categorically excluded from
firearms ownership, and any law that included such conditions within a
definition of the mentally ill would fail strict scrutiny. A law more
narrowly focused on truly delusional people, who have serious trouble
perceiving reality, by contrast, would likely be permissible.
It is also somewhat problematic that the mentally ill are not
excluded from the use of many other devices that may be equally
harmful. A delusional person behind the wheel of an automobile is a
serious menace to society, and a kitchen knife in the hands of a mentallyunbalanced person can be as dangerous as a gun. Why should guns in
particular be excluded from the mentally ill, assuming their need for selfdefense is similar to that of other individuals? A law prohibiting the
mentally ill from using the Internet would likely fail strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment, even if it could be shown that many mentally-ill
persons often use the Internet in ways harmful to themselves and to
others.
In short, although this exception, if focused on a specific subset of
the mentally ill, would probably be upheld under strict scrutiny, it is by
no means a clear-cut case, and a broader law would almost certainly fail.
It is, however, a relatively easy case under a reasonableness test, and
possibly an undue-burden test or an intermediate-scrutiny test.
C.

THE EXCEPTION FOR SENSITIVE PLACES

The exception for sensitive places includes, according to the Court,
government buildings and schools."' What characteristics determine a
"sensitive" place? The Court does not say. Do hospitals, subways, sport
stadiums, train stations, or shopping malls count? And why does the
79. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC
IV) 13-26 (4th ed. 2000).
8o. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
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entire District of Columbia, filled with government buildings and
repeatedly subject to terrorist threats, not qualify as a "sensitive place"?
Since a law simply prohibiting possession of firearms in all "sensitive
places" would be void for vagueness,8' the standard of scrutiny will apply
only to more specific statutory language. This means that lower courts
will have to address, case by case, whether particular locations are
sufficiently "sensitive" to fall within the exception.
One answer may be that the Heller self-defense right, which the
Court claims lies at the heart of the Second Amendment, simply has little
applicability outside the home." This is not entirely implausible, since
Heller provides little guidance on the geographic scope of the selfdefense right. But it is not especially consistent with Heller either. First, if
the right has little applicability outside the home, there would be no need
for the Court to single out "sensitive" places, as opposed to places
outside the home more generally. Second, although it is possible that
most cases of self-defense arise in the home, this is far from obvious, and
Heller at least hints at the value of self-defense outside the home."
Another answer could readily explain the case of at least some
government buildings. One could argue that once a security perimeter
has been established with metal detectors and weapons checks, no
person within the perimeter would need a gun for protection. This would
also explain the case of airports (and given that even First Amendment
rights can be more limited in airports than in other public places,"
restriction of Second Amendment rights should follow as a matter of
course). But this answer cannot cover all of the supposed "sensitive
places." Not all government buildings have security protections in place;
many state and local government buildings have no protection
whatsoever. Nor does it explain the case of schools, most of which do not
have security perimeters at all.
So how do the government buildings and school exceptions fare
under traditional strict scrutiny? The state interest, presumably, is to

81. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 61,
ordinance that used the term "annoying").

614-16 (1971) (invalidating a Cincinnati

82. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
83. See id. at 2793 (citing 2 COLLECrED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1142 & n.X (Kermit L. Hall &

Mark David Hall eds., 2007) (reference to the natural right of defense of "one's person or house")).
Wilson, incidentally, was the one Framer who appears to have actually used firearms in defense of his
house. See Carlton F.W. Larson, The Revolutionary American Jury: A Case Study of the 1778-1779
Philadelphia Treason Trials, 61 SMU L. REV. 1441, I5o6-o8 (2008) (discussing the i779 attack on
Wilson's house by members of the Philadelphia militia). On the applicability of Heller outside the
home, see generally Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?,
59 SYt.AcusE L. REV. 225 (2008).
84. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680-82 (1992) (holding that
airports are nonpublic forums for First Amendment purposes and noting that the security perimeter
distinguished airports from bus and train stations).
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prevent unlawful gun violence from taking place, surely a compelling
interest. Are the restrictions narrowly tailored? Perhaps. If no guns are
permitted in these places, then no gun violence will presumably occur.
But, of course, not every person carrying a gun is necessarily intent on
violent activity; thus such laws are arguably broader than necessary.
Moreover, such an argument was implicitly rejected in Heller, which held
that the solution to handgun violence cannot simply be elimination of all
handguns. On the other hand, it is hard to think of a practical alternative
to gun bans in these places that would actually work. It is possible that a
court could uphold these laws under strict scrutiny, but it is by no means
an obvious case.
The exception for sensitive places would, however, pass muster
under a reasonableness test, an undue-burden test, or an intermediatescrutiny test.
D.

THE EXCEPTION FOR COMMERCIAL REGULATION

The exception for commercial regulation of firearms sales initially
seems to fit comfortably within the Supreme Court's traditional
deference to state regulation of commercial transactions under a
rational-basis test.85 Yet laws regulating such transactions probably
cannot be justified solely because of their commercial aspects. A First
Amendment analogy again is helpful. Suppose a state passed a law
singling out sellers of books for special restrictions, and in general made
it more difficult for individuals to purchase books. Such a law would
surely be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment, and
would almost certainly fail. Similarly, the Court has emphasized that
restrictions on the sale and distribution of contraceptive devices are
subject to heightened scrutiny, notwithstanding the commercial nature of
the laws at issue."' So if commercial sales of guns are to be treated
differently than commercial transactions with respect to other
constitutional rights, the Court ought to explain precisely why that is.
The existence of this exception is yet further evidence that the
relevant test is not strict scrutiny, as most commercial regulations, not
only of guns, but of any product, would probably fail strict scrutiny. Such
regulations, however, would pass a reasonableness test, an undue-burden
test, and probably intermediate scrutiny as well.
CONCLUSION

So what did Heller ultimately hold? How should lower courts,
seeking to be faithful to the Court's opinion, evaluate Second

85. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (938).
86. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689 (1977) (invalidating New York law
forbidding anyone other than a licensed pharmacist from selling nonprescription contraceptives).

1386

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6o:1371

Amendment claims in future cases? One possibility is to apply originalist
analysis similar to that used by the Court in Heller. But this can only
yield partial and incomplete answers to a range of quite difficult
questions, and, moreover, cannot be fully justified given the existence of
the four Heller exceptions.
These exceptions will ultimately have to be justified under some
standard of scrutiny. As explained in Part II, the standard simply cannot
be strict scrutiny, if the exceptions are taken as binding statements of the
law. The exceptions can be easily justified, however, under a
reasonableness standard, and possibly under an undue-burden or an
intermediate-scrutiny test. I have some doubts as to whether a
reasonableness test is consistent with the invalidation of the District of
Columbia handgun ban; perhaps the Court simply viewed the ban as an
extreme form of unreasonable regulation. Nonetheless, my guess is that
the Court is applying a test slightly more stringent than reasonableness.
Beyond that, however, the Heller opinion is quite opaque, and the
relevant standard of scrutiny will be left to the lower courts for initial
development. I make no normative claims as to which of the possible
tests is preferable, leaving that daunting task to others in this
Symposium. 87 I do hope, however, that when the Supreme Court returns
to this area, it does what it conspicuously failed to do in Heller, that is,
explain not only what it has decided, but why.

87. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, Second Amendment Decision Rules, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 1431

(2OO9).

